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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse the impact of policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment strategies. We 
also consider the impact of economic integration upon FDI decisions. The paper follows the real 
options approach, which allows investigating the value to a firm of waiting to invest and/or disinvest, 
when payoffs are stochastic due to political uncertainty and investments are partially reversible. 
Across the board we find that political uncertainty can be very detrimental to FDI decisions while 
economic integration leads to an increasing benefit of investing abroad. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The foreign direct investment (FDI) literature is extensive and consists of three mainstream models. 
The so-called OLI model is a model that tries to identify the attractiveness of a country for foreign 
investors on the basis of ownership, location and internationalisation factors [Dunning (1993)]. The 
gravity model tries to predict FDI flows on the basis of macroeconomic variables like the level of 
GDP, GDP growth and the population size [Brenton and Gros (1997), Brenton and Di Mauro (1998), 
Brock (1998)]. The transaction costs models try to determine which mode of investment is most suited 
for a business based on its cost structure [Buckley and Casson (1981)]. This stream of research 
examines firm choices among alternative market-servicing modes, such as exporting, licensing, or 
joint ventures in addition to full ownership. 
Contrary to this literature, the recent literature on investment interprets a firm as consisting of a 
portfolio of options, and uses options-based pricing techniques to study the investment decision. The 
general idea behind the idea that investment opportunities are option-rights is that each investment 
project can be assimilated, in its nature, to the purchase of a financial call option, where the investor 
pays a premium price in order to get the right to buy an asset for some time at a predetermined price 
(exercise price), and eventually different from the spot market price of the asset (strike price). 
Analogously, the firm, in its investment decision, pays a price (the cost of setting up the project) which 
gives her the right to use the capital (exercise price), now or in the future, in return for an asset worth a 
strike price. Taking into account this options-based approach, the calculus of profitability cannot be 
done simply applying the net present value rule to the expected future cash flows of the operation, but 
has rather to consider the following three characteristics of the investment decision: 
1. there is uncertainty about future payoffs from the investment; 
2. the investment does not entail a now-or-never decision and 
3. the investment is at least partially irreversible. 
The three characteristics imply that the opportunity cost of investment includes the value of the option 
to wait that is extinguished when an investment decision is taken. Therefore, the investment decision 
is affected by the determinants of the value of this option and consequently, an appropriate 
identification of the optimal exercise strategies for real options plays a crucial role in the maximisation 
of a firm´s value.1 
                                                          
1 Most of the FDI literature relies on non-stochastic models. Some notable exceptions include Buckley and Tse 
(1996), Clark (2003), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), Tong and Reuer (2007) and Wong (2006). Aizenman and 
Marion (1993) have constructed an endogenous growth model that focuses on irreversible investment as a 
channel that links policy volatility and growth. All these ppaers model uncertainty via a geometric Brownian 
motion. Garibaldi et al. (2002) has confirmed that the quality of institutions and governance and macroeconomic 
stability are important factors in determining the level and regional allocation of FDI flows. 
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Almost uniformly, the real options literature focuses on the effect of demand, price and/or exchange 
rate uncertainty upon investment decisions of firms.2 The scope of this paper is to apply the real 
option theory to the case of foreign direct investment under political instability, i.e. we aim to explain 
FDI decisions with a specific focus on the political environment. for our purpose we describe political 
risk as the risk that arises from the potential actions of governments and/or other influential forces 
which threaten expected returns on investment. Closely linked to political risk is the concept of 
political instability which is generally defined as the propensity of an imminent government change, 
either by constitutional (elections) or unconstitutional means (revolutions or coups d´état).  
                                                          
Another form of uncertainty faced by investors is the imperfect credibility of policy reforms. 
Investment-friendly reforms typically raise expected returns, but may also increase uncertainty if 
investors believe that the reform measures could be reversed. In such context, investors’ perceptions 
about the probability of policy reversal become a key determinant of the investment response. These 
issues are explored by Rodrick (1991) using a model in which investment involves sunk costs of entry 
and exit. He shows that a reform favourable to capital, but regarded as less than fully credible, will fail 
to trigger off an investment response unless the return on capital becomes high enough to compensate 
investors for the losses they would incur should the reversal take place. Similar qualitative conclusions 
are reached by van Wijnbergen (1985) who considers the case of a trade reform suspected to be only 
temporary.3 
The hypothesis that an unstable political environment can become a powerful aggregate investment 
deterrent seems to be supported by mounting empirical evidence. Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) find that measures of government instability, unrest and political violence are significantly 
related to cross-country differences in investment and growth. Keefer and Knack (1995) show that 
indicators of uncertainties in property rights enforcement (perceived risk of expropriation and 
repudiation of contracts) derived from expert surveys are negatively associated with private 
investment performance across countries. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) and Mauro (1995) find that 
political uncertainty and an aggregate institutional indicator (a bribery and corruption indicator) is 
negatively associated with aggregate investment spending. Brunetti and Weder (1998) have found that 
high corruption, a lack of rule of law, and volatility in real exchange rate distortions are most 
detrimental to aggregate investment spending. The literature concerning the empirical investigation of 
2 The literature is too vast to survey here. Excellent surveys of the real options literature are provided by Amran 
and Kulatilaka (1999), Copeland and Antikarov (2001), Coy (1999), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Lander and 
Pinches (1998). Graham and Harvey (2001) survey a large representative set of US firms and find that a quarter 
of them incorporates the real options of a project when evaluating it. 
3 It should be pointed out, however, that a higher level of investment may encourage the host government to 
change policies in the future, so that a firm anticipating this kind of time inconsistency will tend to be self-
protective, assuming that the jump parameter is positively correlated with the stock of invested capital and 
therefore an endogenous variable. See Cherian and Perotti (2001) for a discussion of the effects of strategic 
interactions drawing inspirations from the time-inconsistency literature. In the context of transition economies, a 
number of governments have employed external policy bindings like the eastern enlargement of the EU as a 
means to alleviate investor concerns about policy uncertainty.  
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the main macroeconomic determinants of FDI flows, also connotes the importance of political and 
economic instability. Finally, Busse and Hefeker (2007) show that foreign direct investment is highly 
affected by various factors of political risk, such as government stability, internal and external conflict, 
law and order, corruption, ethnic tensions, and quality of bureaucracy. 
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. The next section of the paper describes the 
model and assumptions, drawing inspiration from the real options literature. In section 3, we derive the 
analytical solution and section 4 contains a numerical analysis. Finally, section 5 provides a summary 
and some general comments pertaining to policy implications and future research. 
 
2. The Basic Model of Investment with Adjustment Costs 
 
Formally, we assume an economy where the individual firm maximises the intertemporal objective 
function 
 
(1)  ( ) ( )( )∫ −= ∞ −0 dteICKV rtttπ
 
where π(⋅) is the twice differentiable maximised value of the firm’s instantaneous profits with πK > 0 
and πKK < 0, r is the discount rate, and C(⋅) are the total investment expenditures.4 The firm is risk-
neutral, but the owners may be risk averse.5 These standard assumptions guarantee that the firm’s 
problem is well-behaved. The total costs of investment are determined by  
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Fixed costs aK are non-negative costs of investment that are independent of the level of investment. 
However, a firm can avoid these fixed costs by setting investment to zero. Purchase (sale) costs are the 
costs of buying (selling) capital. Let  ( ) be the price per unit of investment good at which the 
firm can buy (sell) any amount of capital. We assume that  ≥  ≥ 0.
pK
+ pK
−
pK
+ pK
− 6 Adjustment costs c(⋅) are 
                                                          
4 In the model, capital is the only fixed factor, while other productive inputs (e.g., labour) can be costlessly 
adjusted in the face of changing prices. In other words, π(⋅) accounts for whatever optimisation the firm can do 
on dimensions other than K. 
5 The assumption of risk-neutrality can be relaxed and risk aversion can be assumed instead by using the CAPM 
and calculating a risk-adjusted discount rate. See Harrison and Kreps (1979), for example.  
6 Thus, we relax the assumption that FDI be irreversible. Instead we assume that reversibility is a continuous 
rather than a dichotomous concept. The assumption of complete irreversibility is given by . 0=−pK
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continuous and strictly convex in I satisfying c(0) = 0, cI > 0 and cII > 0. Considering the depreciation 
of capital, the adjustment of capital over time is denoted by  
 
(3) KI
dt
dK δ−= ,  
 
where δ  represents the depreciation rate. To solve the model, we consider the Bellman equation 
 
(4)  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )KIqICK
dt
dVEICKrV δππ −+−=+−= . 
 
The first condition characterising the optimum is the derivative of the Bellman equation with respect 
to the control variable (I) is zero, i.e. 
 
(5) qcp IK =+
−+ , 
 
where q ≡  denotes Tobin´s marginal q. Note that since CI  is increasing in I, equation (5) implies 
that investment is increasing in q, i.e. 
KV
 
(6) ( )qfI tt =     with and . 0)1( / ==−+pf K 0>′f
 
The above model of investment has at least one failure as a description of actual behaviour. Our 
analysis so far assumes that firms are certain about future revenues. In practice, however, they face 
uncertainty. Thus we need to modify the model if we are to obtain a reasonable picture of actual 
foreign direct investment decision. To evaluate such impacts, it is necessary to recognise that 
investment and production are inherently dynamic and uncertain processes. Acknowledging the high 
degree of irreversibility associated with FDI ventures, let’s assume that FDI decisions may be 
represented by a set of real options to acquire productive assets abroad. Consequently, an appropriate 
identification of the optimal exercise strategies for real options plays a crucial role in the maximisation 
of the firm’s value. So far, the real options literature provides relatively little insight into the impact of 
institutional and policy uncertainty on the investment decision of a firm although many people would 
agree with the view that policy uncertainty and instability can be serious obstacles to fixed investment 
decisions. The existing papers mainly consider continuous changes in the value of relevant variables. 
This, most of the time, results in the assumption that the entire uncertainty in the economy can be 
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described by a geometric Brownian motion.7 It is, however, more realistic to model institutional and 
policy uncertainty as a process that makes infrequent but discrete jumps. In such cases, use can be 
made of the Poisson jump process.8 
On the supply side of the economy, we assume that the present value of operating profits is given by 
 
(7)  ( ) ( ) at gKtK −= 1π
 
where t represents transportation costs.9 We think of transportation costs as a stand-in for tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers, in addition to direct transport costs. We model these costs as iceberg costs. 
Specifically, if profits are earned abroad, then profits are lost in transit. The productivity 
parameter g is intended to proxy for all aspects of the environment of the host country impinging on 
the incentive to invest, such as demand and exchange rate fluctuations, capital control regulations, 
weak and poorly enforced property rights, government instability, unstable incentive frameworks, 
discontinuous changes in the tax environment, social unrest, etc. In other words, g measures the host 
country’s potential in generating profits. In this paper, we propose a simple unifying framework where 
the parameter g is allowed to jump or drop, combined with continuous-time stochastic process. 
Consequently, our objective is to model explicitly the dynamics of policy uncertainty and its effect on 
foreign direct investment when the firm has incomplete information about the moment of the change. 
This feature of the policy process is particularly relevant in developing countries and transition 
countries where investors may be particularly wary of the potential for radical and unexpected swings 
in economic policy. It is assumed that g follows the combined geometric Brownian motion and jump 
process  
agK atgK
 
(8)  21 ττση ddgdWgdtdg +++= , 
 
where W  is a Wiener process; dtdW tε=  (since  is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and a standard deviation of unity, and  is serially uncorrelated due to the assumption 
of independent increments), η is the drift parameter, σ the variance parameter, dτ1 and dτ2 are the 
tε
tε
                                                          
7 The use of option-pricing models that capture the role of uncertainty in international economics is well-
established since the mid 1980s. Some of the most influential contributions focused on providing a theoretical 
argument to explain the hysteretic effect that the large exchange rate swings of the 1980s had on trade prices and 
quantities. Foreign firms that entered the U.S. market during the first half of the 1980s, when the real U.S. Dollar 
exchange rate was appreciating, could not exit when the U.S. Dollar returned to its original level due to the sunk 
costs incurred. The exchange rate would have had to decline strictly below the level that triggered entry in order 
to induce firms to exit [see, for example, Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989)].  
8 An interesting recent application is provided by Hassett and Metcalf (1999) who analyse changes in the 
investment tax credit in a setting where a Poisson process describes discrete changes in the tax regime. 
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increments of Poisson processes (with mean arrival rates λ1 and λ2). With this process, η is the 
expected growth rate of profitability, i.e. E[(gτ/gt)|gt] = exp[η(τ-t)] for τ ≥ t.10 It is assumed that if an 
“event 1” (“event 2”) occurs, g increases (falls) by φ1 (φ2) percent with probability 1. Over each time 
interval dt there is a probability λ1dt (or λ2dt) that it will rise (drop) by φ1g (φ2g) and Z fluctuates until 
next event occurs. Additionally, we assume that (dτ1, dτ2) and dW are independent to each other, i.e. 
( ) 01 =τdWdE , ( ) 02 =τdWdE , and E(dτ1dτ2) = 0. Equation (8) indicates that there are two sources 
of uncertainty. Type I uncertainty represented by the geometric Brownian motion captures exchange 
rate and/or demand uncertainty. To understand FDI behaviour, we should also consider the political 
risks investors are facing. We have therefore additionally assumed type II uncertainty (represented by 
the independent jump processes). This newly added uncertainty represents political and/or institutional 
uncertainty.11 In our work, the timing of the potential policy shifts is exogenous.12 
To complete the economic model, we are assuming quadratic costs of adjustment in order to replicate 
the empirical fact that the capital stock displays considerable smoothness and inertia 
 
( )(9) I 2Ic
2
γ
=
                                        
. 
 
In the scenario hypothesised below, it is assumed that the firm assigns constant probabilities of the 
government changing policy, i.e. it is time itself and not the state of the economy that governs the 
change. The next section solves the real options setup under political uncertainty. 
 
3. Solution to the Optimal Stopping Problem 
 
The decision whether or not to engage in FDI constitutes an optimal stopping problem, for which the 
relevant Bellman equation is 
                                                                                                                                             
9 Transportation costs are essential since without transportation costs there is no geography and therefore it is 
unclear why a firm should invest abroad rather than domestically. 
10 The drift parameter may represent productivity improvements during the catching-up process of transition 
economies.  
11 Recall that one might distinguish two types of political variables: on one hand, variables such as interest rates 
which, although political in the sense of being set or influenced by government, are represented by type I 
uncertainty; on the other, variables, such as a government´s announcement of costly politically-inspired laws and 
regulations or, even, expropriation. These variables signalling a shift from one profit function to a completely 
different one are represented by type II uncertainty. There are a few papers that have performed related work but 
none has emphasized the interaction between type I and type II sources of uncertainty that surround FDI 
decisions. On a methodological level, the closest work to ours is that of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), pp. 303-309. 
12 An important assumption of the model is that investment does not resolve political uncertainty, it is time that 
resolves uncertainty. Clearly, this assumption will not be valid for other types of uncertainty in which the firm 
gains the critical information because it has invested. For example, R&D investments will give the firm 
information about the likelihood of a product´s success. In practical terms, we are not exploring endogenous 
uncertainty but exogenous uncertainty that may (or may not) be resolved with time but cannot be resolved by 
action on part of the firm. 
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and the optimal condition for I is denoted by  
 
(11) 
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In this framework, the optimal investment strategy is a two-trigger policy that can be expressed in 
terms of Tobin´s q. If q exceeds the upper threshold  gross investment occurs. In turn, if q falls 
below a lower threshold , negative investment takes place – the firm sells part of its capital stock. 
In the region of inaction , investment equals zero. Table 1 gives the intuition behind this 
result. 
qK
+
qK
−
−
Kp
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Table 1: The Optimality Conditions 
 Marginal Benefit (MB)  Marginal Cost (MC) MB=MC and I = 0 
I ≥ 0
 
Firm’s value raised by q Buying additional K for price  and +Kp
paying for marginal adjustment 
cost for K: Iγ  
Ipq K γ+= ++  
+
+ =⇒ Kpq  
0I ≤
 
Selling the redundant K 
 for  −Kp
Firm’s value reduced by q and  
paying for marginal adjustment 
cost for K: Iγ−  since I is negative 
−
−
=− KpIq γ  
−
−
=⇒ Kpq  
 
Given (11), the firm´s solution to the optimal stopping time requires  
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or, equivalently 
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Substituting into the Bellman equation (10) we have 
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Using the definitions , ,  and  and differentiating both sides 
with respect to K, we are able to rewrite (14) in the following form: 
KVq = Kgg Vq = KKK Vq = Kgggg Vq =
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The optimal stopping problem is simplified by observing that we have  and  within the 
no-action region. In this case, equation (15) therefore takes the following simpler form 
+
= Kpq
−
= Kpq
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The solutions for (16) consist of the particular and general solutions, i.e. . Given 
the above model, we can show that the following holds:
=+= GP qqq −+ /Kp
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where  and  are unknown parameters and β1 and β2 are the positive and negative roots of the 
characteristic equation (19),  respectively. The set of boundary conditions that applies to this optimal 
stopping problem is composed by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions 
1A 2A
 
                                                          
13 See Appendix A and B for formal proofs. Outside and inside the no-action-area, the problem in its general 
form has no closed form solution because the term 
( )
γ
KK qpq
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−
does not disappear.  
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The value matching conditions require the equality between the net present value of the project and the 
value of the option. The smooth pasting conditions require the equality between the slopes of the net 
present value of the investment project and the value of the option. Equations (19) – (23) determine 
the two thresholds (g+ and g-) that bisect the firm´s decision-making space into a zone where it is 
optimal to exercise the option and a no action zone where the firm maximises its value by leaving the 
option unexercised. In other words, in the no action range between g+ and g- the firm´s optimal policy 
is to continue with the status quo, i.e. the firm will neither invest nor disinvest.    
The next section makes use of numerical techniques to generate simulations of the demand of fixed 
assets exposed to political risk. 
 
4. Numerical Simulations 
 
To have a feel on the quantitative importance of the various parameters discussed above, we present 
some numerical examples. All simulations are performed with regard to a benchmark case (see 
Appendix C for a description of the benchmark parameters).14 In order to check the sensitivity of the 
thresholds to these benchmark parameters, optimal decision rules are then computed for alternative 
parameter combinations.  
Figure 1 provides a sensitivity analysis of the thresholds with respect to λ1 and λ2, i.e. we illustrate the 
impact of alternative arrival rates upon the optimal investment and dis-investment thresholds. The 3-D 
graphs clearly indicate the entire no-action areas. If λ2 increases, then the g+ investment threshold will 
rise – firms will be more reluctant to invest to avoid getting caught with too much capital, should the 
future turn out worse than expected. By contrast, if the future turns out better than expected, the firm 
can just add more capital as needed. The implication is that the textbook net present value rule is 
blantly inappropriate in any context other than the unrealistic setting where sunk costs are negligible 
and there is certainty regarding the determinants of the profitability of the project to be undertaken. On 
                                                          
14 The numerical boundary value problem is solved with the method of Newton-Raphson for nonlinear systems. 
A description of the numerical programming technique is provided in Press et al. (2002). 
 10
the contrary, if λ1 increases, then the g+ threshold declines. The less accentuated curvature of the g+ 
threshold with respect to λ1 results because there are two offsetting effects. First, an increase in λ1 
increases the option value of waiting and therefore delays investment decisions. On the other hand, a 
higher λ1 parameter raises expected profitability and, ceteris paribus, the desired capital stock.15 This 
effect goes in opposite direction to the threshold effect above, and the net result is in general 
indeterminate. This qualitative result is consistent with Bernanke´s (1983) bad news principle: under 
investment irreversibility, bad events affect the firm´s propensity to invest.16  
 
Figure 1: The Threshold Values as Functions of λ1 and λ2 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Let us next examine how the drift term affects the firm´s decision. Figure 2 shows the thresholds for η 
= 0.00. This makes no meaningful difference to the profit maximising tactic except that political 
instability poses an even more formidable obstacle to FDI decisions.17 
 
                                                          
15 Or said another way, in some cases the g+ threshold falls as uncertainty increases; the threshold elasticity of 
investment is negative. One may describe this behaviour as inferior. 
16 As stated by Bernanke (1983, pp. 92-93), “The investor who declines to invest in project i today (...) gives up 
short-run returns. In exchange for the sacrifice, he enters period t+1 with an „option“ (...). In deciding whether to 
“buy” this option (...), the investor therefore considers only “bad news” states in t+1 (...)”.  
17 These large premia are consistent with the high hurdle rates applied in practice by firm managers when 
assessing investment projects. 
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Figure 2: The Threshold Values as Functions of λ1 and λ2 for η = 0.00 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Figure 3: The Threshold Values as Functions of φ1 and φ2 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
 
0 0.
08 0
.1
6 0.
24 0
.3
2 0
.4
0
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.4
1.05
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.13
1.15
1.17
1.19
1.21
1.23
1.25
g+
φ 2
φ1
0 0.
08 0
.1
6 0.
24 0
.3
2 0.
4
0
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.4
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
g -
φ 2
φ1
 
 
Figure 3 shows how the magnitude of the jumps (represented by φ1 and φ2) affects investment. Two 
main messages emerge from Figure 3. The first concerns the investment threshold: The simulations 
suggest that perceived downside risks act as an important deterrent to FDI. Pari passu, an unreliable 
political environment system translates into a higher no action area and hence lowers FDI and the 
efficiency in the host country’s economy. This implies that a nation that takes steps to increase the 
degree of political stability could expect significant increases in the level of FDI into their country. 
This increased investment translates into more resources, which in turn increases social welfare and 
economic efficiency. The impact of φ1 on the optimal investment rule is non-monotonic. This is due to 
the fact that there are two terms that depend upon φ1. The first of these is the option value of waiting 
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which is increasing in φ1 while the second is expected profitability. As a result, at first glance the 
relation between φ1 and g+ is ambiguous. The second argument concerns the dis-investment threshold. 
Again the result is that the threshold for dis-investment is rather flat. 
Let us now consider changes in σ. In other words, we analyse the sensitivity of the optimal thresholds 
with respect to changes in the volatility of the geometric Brownian motion representing demand and/or 
exchange rate uncertainty for given values of political uncertainty. As in the existing literature, we 
find that the threshold value at which investment takes place is increasing in the “noisiness” level even 
though the firm is risk neutral. In volatile environments, the best tactic is to keep options open and 
await new information rather than commit an investment today.18 
 
Figure 4: The Threshold Values as Function of σ 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0.19 0.39 0.59 0.79 0.99
p-
g 
th
er
es
ho
ld
s
investment thresholds for g, g+
dis-investment thresholds for g, g-
 
The final issue that we wish to explore is whether the relationship between FDI and risk is sensitive to 
different levels of integration. More specifically, we consider transportation cost changes. Intuition 
tells us that increasing integration leading to declining transportation costs (lower t) should lower the 
no action area. Indeed this is the case, as depicted in Figure 5. Furthermore, the core prediction of the 
three-dimensional graphs in Figure 6 and 7 is that the importance of the political risk measured via  
or  is decreasing in t. The numerical results therefore indicate that integration reduces firms´ 
economic exposure to downside risk and changes the mode of internationalisation. 
φ2
λ2
 
 
                                                          
18 Figure 4 reveals that the g+ surface is much more sensitive to changes in σ  than the g- surface. 
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Figure 5: The Threshold Values as Function of t 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Figure 6: The Threshold Values as Functions of t and φ2 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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Figure 7: The Threshold Values as Functions of t and λ2 
(The values of the other parameters are those presented in Appendix C) 
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5. Summary Remarks and Conclusions 
 
Using standard methods of stochastic calculus, we have looked in detail at the link between political 
uncertainty, economic integration and foreign direct investment spending by employing ideas and 
analytical techniques developed in the real options literature. Of course, the model developed in this 
paper is stylized and may not capture all of the details. However, our model clarifies thinking on the 
inter-linkages between policy uncertainty, option value and the timing of FDI at the firm level. The 
main result is that an uncertain political environment exerts a non-trivial influence upon FDI 
decisions. Furthermore, economic integration reduces the impact of policy uncertainty. These 
appealing insights can enrich theory by clarifying issues concerning the "if" and "when" of FDI. 
An important feature of our model is that the opportunity to invest or disinvest is assigned to one firm 
only, i.e. the analysis was decidedly partial equilibrium. Yet it is obvious that one cannot just translate 
mechanically the above microeconomic results to aggregate investment. One implication is that 
waiting may no longer be feasible when FDI is available to any of several firms. There can be strategic 
situations with more firms, where moving first may be profitable. In practice, these considerations 
may call for early investment at the same time that political uncertainty suggests waiting. The optimal 
choice would then have to balance the two. To assess the role of political uncertainty in aggregate 
investment it is also essential to take explicitly into consideration the heterogeneity of individual 
firms´ investment decisions. Bertola and Caballero (1994) have explored the implications of 
irreversibility for aggregate investment in a model in which individual firms´ investment proceeds in 
discontinuous bursts. Individual investments are not synchronized, and firms are subject to 
idiosyncratic uncertainty in addition to aggregate uncertainty. As a result, aggregate uncertainty shows 
smoothness and a shock may take a long time to develop its full impact. Finally, the discussion 
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ignored the ability of, and incentives for, firms to diversify their capital stock internationally in times 
of political uncertainty. This diversification may partially offset the forces highlighted here. 
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Appendix A: The Derivation of Equation (17) 
 
Equation (16) is a differential equation of a familiar form. Our experience suggests that the solution 
takes the form 
 
(A1) . aBgKq −= 1
 
Then, we have , ,  , and 
. Substituting into equation (16) yields 
a
g BKq
−
=
1
( ) aK −+ 111 φ
0=ggq ( ) aK BgKaq −−= 1 , ( )( ) ( ) aKBggq −−=− 122 11 φφ
( )( ) Bggq =+ 11 φ
 
(A2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]2211 1111 φλφληδδ −−−−+++−−−=+ BBBBBBataBr . 
 
Rearranging and collecting terms yields 
( )
2211
1
φλφληδ +−−+
−
=
ar
taB . 
 
It is then straightforward to obtain equation (17). 
 
Appendix B: The Derivation of Equations (18) and (19) 
 
The homogeneous part of the Bellman’s equation is denoted by: 
 
(B1) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]22112
2
11
2
φλφλσηδδ −−−−++++−=+ gqqqgqqggqKqqr gggK . 
 
The homogeneous solutions should have the same components as in particular solutions. Assume the 
homogeneous solutions have the functional form 
 
(B2) . ( )βagKAq −= 1
 
Then we have 
 
(B3) , ( ) ( )βδβδ aK gKAaKq −−−=− 11
 
(B4) , ( )βηβη ag gKAgq −= 1
 
(B5)  ( ) ( )βββσσ agg gKAggq −−= 122 12121 , 
 
(B6) , ( )( ) ( ) ( )ββφφ agKAgq −+=+ 111 11
 
(B7)  . ( )( ) ( ) ( )ββφφ agKAgq −−=− 122 11
 
Now substitute into equation (B1). It is straightforward to obtain the following characteristic equation: 
 
(B8) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) 0111111
2
1
2211
2
=+−−−−−+++−−− δφλφληβδβββσ ββ ra  
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Equation (19) is thus proven.  
 
Appendix C: The Benchmark Parameters 
 
We set the central benchmark parameters as follows: σ  = 0.18, η = 0.03, r = 0.03, δ = 0.08, λ1 = 0.05, 
λ2 = 0.05, φ1 = 0.2, φ2 = 0.2,  = 1.0,  =  0.2, a = 0.65, and the initial value for capital (K) = 100. 
All these parameters seem reasonable on an annual basis.  
+
Kp
−
Kp
The most straightforward measure of transport costs in international trade is the difference between the 
cif and fob quotations of trade. The difference between these two values is a measure of the cost of 
getting an item from the exporting country to the importing country. Hummels (2007) has shown that 
freight rates have declined in the post World War II period. Given the evidence in Radelet and Sachs 
(1998), we assume t = 0.05 as our benchmark parameter.   
To motivate the analysis of policy uncertainty, special attention has to be paid to the calibration of the 
Poisson processes. The Poisson process implies that the likelihood of a policy change is determined by 
the arrival rate λ. This means that the time t one has to wait for the switch event to occur is a random 
variable whose distribution is exponential with parameter λ: 
 
(C1) { } e ttbeforeoccurseventprobtF λ−−=≡ 1)(  
 
The corresponding probability density is 
 
(C2) e ttFtf λ λ−=′≡ )()(  
 
In other words, the probability that the event will occur sometime within the short interval between t0 
and t0+dt is approximately λe-λtdt. In particular, the probability that it will occur within dt from now 
(when t = 0) is approximately λdt. In this sense λ is the probability per unit of time. Moreover, the 
number of policy changes (x) that will take place over any interval of length Δ is distributed according 
to the Poisson distribution 
 
(C3)  { } ( )
!
)(
x
occureventxprobxg e
x Δ−Δ
=≡
λλ  
 
whose expected value is the arrival rate times the length of the interval λΔ. We can back out from 
equation (C3) the agent´s beliefs about policy changes. As a guide to calibration, the Table below 
provides the probabilities that either one (x = 1) or three (x = 3) jumps will occur within 5 years (Δ = 
5) or 10 years (Δ = 10) for the three arrival rates λ = 0.01, λ = 0.05 and λ = 0.10, respectively. For 
example, for λ = 0.05 the probability that one jump will occur within 5 years is 19.5 percent.  
 
Table: Jump Probabilities for the Poisson Process 
 λ = 0.01  λ = 0.05 λ = 0.10 
prob{1 event in 5 years} 0.048 0.195 0.303 
prob{3 events in 5 years} 0.000002 0.002 0.013 
prob{1 event in 10 years} 0.090 0.303 0.368 
prob{3 events in 10 years} 0.0001 0.012 0.061 
 
The results indicate that for λ = 0.10 the firm faces a very substantial exposure to political risk. The 
variability embodied with λ1,2 = 0.05 therefore seems to be a plausible and realistic parameterization 
of the model for emerging market and transition economies. 
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